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Finding Loopholes in Sanctions: 
Effects of Sanctions on North Korea’s Refined Oil Prices† 
By KYOOCHUL KIM* 
The international community’s sanctions against North Korea, 
triggered by North Korea’s nuclear tests and by missile development in 
the country, are considered the strongest sanctions in history, banning 
exports of North Korea’s major items and limiting imports of machinery 
and oil products. Accordingly, North Korea’s trade volume decreased to 
the level of collapse after the sanctions, meaning that the sanctions 
against North Korea were considered to be effective. However, 
according to this paper, which analyzed the price fluctuations of refined 
petroleum products in North Korea through the methodology of an event 
study, the market prices of oil products were only temporarily affected 
by the sanctions and remained stable over the long run despite the 
restrictions on the volumes of refined petroleum products introduced. 
This can be explained by evidence that North Korea has introduced 
refined oil supplies that are not much different from those before the 
sanctions through its use of illegal transshipments even after the 
sanctions. With regard to strategic materials such as refined oil, the 
North Korean authorities are believed to be desperately avoiding 
sanctions by, for instance, finding loopholes in the sanctions to meet the 
minimum level of demand. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
uring 2016 and 2017, North Korea conducted three nuclear tests and four missile 
launches, and in response, the international community strengthened its sanctions 
against North Korea. The sanctions are aimed at deterring North Korea from developing  
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nuclear weapons, and in order to achieve this, the main means are to block the inflow 
of foreign currency into North Korea and to ban the import of goods related to its 
nuclear development efforts. Specifically, the main goals of the sanctions against 
North Korea is to ban the exports of anthracite, processed garments, and marine 
products, with the goal of limiting the acquisition of foreign currency by North 
Korea, and to ban the import of machinery, setting a limit on the amount of oil (crude 
oil and refined oil products) introduced and thus hurting the North Korean economy.1 
To evaluate whether these economic sanctions were effective as a means to achieve 
these goals, verification of the effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea must 
be regarded as a very important task. 
Discussions of the effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea are mainly 
focused on North Korea’s foreign trade. The impact of sanctions, identified by trade 
data, is easily confirmed, with North Korea’s exports amounting to $260 million in 
2019, only nine percent of the $2.9 billion in 2016, just before the sanctions. 
Moreover, at the 2018 US-North Korea summit in Singapore, the effectiveness of 
sanctions was gaining strength again, as it was known that Kim Jong-un’s most 
important request was to lift the sanctions. On the other hand, if we look at economic 
indicators inside North Korea, such as rice prices and market exchange rates 2 
observed in informal markets there, it appears that sanctions have yet to exert any 
influence, as these figures, used to determine North Korea’s price index, remain 
fairly stable even after the sanctions. Therefore, concluding that the sanctions were 
effective against North Korea remains controversial. 
In North Korea, like other countries, oil resources are necessarily very important 
strategic materials. Because North Korea is not an oil-producing country, the 
introduction of crude oil and refined products is directly related to the stability of the 
North Korean regime. There have been numerous UN Security Council sanctions 
against North Korea, but limiting the introduction of oil is the last stage. As the 
sanctions against North Korea have gradually strengthened, it can be said that the 
international community used oil sanctions as the last resort. The oil restriction was 
an important issue for both North Korea and the international community, as some 
say that China and Russia, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and in 
amicable relations with North Korea, reached an agreement only at the end. 
This paper initially examines how sanctions against North Korea affected how the 
market prices of refined oil products (gasoline and diesel), the main items under 
sanction, fluctuated in North Korea. The study also hypothesizes and explains why 
sanctions have or have not affected the prices of refined petroleum products. 
According to the analysis, the prices of refined petroleum products traded in North 
Korea’s marketplaces, though they were temporarily affected by sanctions, remained 
stable in the long run. This suggests that there has not been much change in long-
term supply and demand levels, although there have been short-term fluctuations in 
oil prices due to sentimental factors for North Koreans.  
 
1In addition, financial sanctions and bans on overseas workers are included, but items for people's livelihood 
and humanitarian purposes that are not related to nuclear and missile development are not subject to sanctions. 
2DailyNK’s homepage, a media source specializing in the situation inside North Korea, regularly provides data 
on North Korea’s market prices for rice and informal market exchange rates (to the US dollar) on its website. The 
period of data recording is from August of 2009 until recently, and price data are reported 2~3 times a month 
(https://www.dailynk.com/english/market-trends). 
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If these findings are accurate, this leads to the question of how the market price of 
refined oil in North Korea can remain stable despite the fact that the introduction of 
refined oil is restricted due to the sanctions. This can be explained by annual reports 
by the UN Security Council’s North Korea Sanctions Committee, which estimates 
the magnitudes of illegal transshipments of refined petroleum products. These 
reports suggest that even after the sanctions restricted the introduction of refined 
petroleum products, the amount of refined petroleum products procured by North 
Korea may not differ greatly from that before the sanctions. This does not mean that 
sanctions are completely useless or ineffective. With regard to essential strategic 
materials such as oil, the North Korean authorities will seek a loophole in the 
sanctions, which could halve their effects. 
This study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews recent studies on economic 
sanctions. Chapter 3 outlines international sanctions against North Korea and 
summarizes the ongoing discussion about the effectiveness of sanctions against 
North Korea. Chapter 4 examines data on North Korea’s refined oil prices and other 
related variables. Chapter 5 constructs an econometric model to analyze the impact 
of sanctions on North Korea’s refined oil prices and presents the results. Chapter 6 
hypothesizes the reason for this outcome and presents supporting evidence. Chapter 
7 summarizes the discussion and concludes this paper. 
 
II. Literature Review 
  
Thus far, sanctions a means of foreign policy have been the subject of much 
scholarly research. Studies that comprehensively analyzed economic sanctions show 
that the likelihood of successful sanctions is not very high. Hufbauer et al. (2009) 
reviewed more than 200 sanctions – finding only one-third to be successful – and 
explained various reasons for the failure of sanctions. Biersteker et al. (2013) argued 
that only 22% of UN sanctions can be assessed as successful. However, other studies 
suggest that economic sanctions are effective. Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015) 
reported that sanctions imposed by the UN had a negative impact on the economic 
growth of 67 sanctioned countries over a long period of time through a fixed effect 
regression model with panel data from 1976 to 2012. As such, conclusions about the 
impact of economic sanctions are still mixed. 
Many of the papers dealing with sanctions examined the impact of sanctions in 
certain economic fields. Among them, the most studied sector is foreign trade, as the 
main targets of economic sanctions are concentrated in foreign trade. Haidar (2017) 
analyzed the effects of sanctions through Iran’s export data by utilizing the 
difference-in-difference approach using dummy variables of pre- and post-sanctions 
and whether or not the country was subject to sanctions. The findings showed that 
total exports increased, but eventually welfare losses were followed by lower prices 
and increased supply levels. Caruso (2003) examined the effects of economic 
sanctions imposed by the United States on trade over a long period of time through 
a panel gravity model with sanction dummy variables, showing that multilateral 
sanctions have a significant negative impact on trade flows. In addition, some studies 
analyzing the impact of sanctions have also looked at the effects on trade. Using 
gravity equations, Evenett (2002) confirmed that U.S. sanctions have had a major 
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impact, such as reducing South Africa’s exports by a third. Crozet et al. (2020) 
investigated how French export firms react to sanctions through fixed-effects binary 
choice estimators with monthly data. Their study found an asymmetrical trade effect, 
demonstrating that while new sanctions reduce the probability of the entry of a 
company, lifting the sanctions does not immediately mean that it starts exporting. 
They also showed that companies with experience in exporting to countries subject 
to sanctions ease the impact of the sanctions, especially when the exporting company 
is specialized in "crisis countries," which become less affected by the sanctions. 
Besedeš et al. (2017) analyzed the effects of financial sanctions by applying a 
difference-in-difference method and showed that financial activity between 
Germany and countries subject to sanctions decreased significantly after the 
sanctions were activated.  
The first time international sanctions against North Korea began was in 2006, and 
they were intended to condemn North Korea’s first nuclear test and ballistic missile 
launch. Since then, sanctions against North Korea were instigated several times in 
response to North Korean military provocations, but it can be said that the sanctions 
against North Korea began to take effect in the second half of 2017. This occurred 
because China, which accounts for more than 90 percent of North Korea’s trade, 
began to participate substantially in sanctions against North Korea starting in 2017. 
China was forced to adhere to the sanctions against North Korea because the clause 
on exceptions to people’s livelihoods had been removed and the volume and quantity 
of items banned from trade were set. In other words, it was not until the second half 
of 2017 that sanctions against North Korea started to be effective, with China’s 
participation. Therefore, despite the great interest of the international community, 
only three years have passed since sanctions on North Korea took effect, and though 
they remain an ongoing issue, there are not many studies on sanctions on North 
Korea at this point. 
Of course, there are a number of studies on sanctions against North Korea in the 
period before the sanctions became effective. For example, Lee (2018) studied the 
impact of sanctions against North Korea on regional economic inequality in North 
Korea using an instrumental variable. There are also several descriptive, 
explanatory-based studies of the impact of sanctions imposed after 2017 on the North 
Korean economy, but it is difficult to find an econometric analysis. In this respect, 
the present study has contributed to a more rigorous examination of recent sanctions 
against North Korea. 
This study related to work by Dreger et al. (2016), who studied sanctions and oil 
prices. An empirical analysis there showed that the depreciation in value of the 
Russian ruble appears to have been influenced by crude oil prices rather than by 
economic sanctions in the western world, raising questions about the effectiveness 
of sanctions. This analysis is based on cointegrated VAR models in which long-term 
relationships between variables are established. 
The present study aims to examine the impact of sanctions against North Korea, 
an area that has not been studied much despite the fact that it is the most important 
concern of the international community at present. Sanctions against North Korea, 
like other economic sanctions, are designed to have a direct impact on the North 
Korean foreign trade sector. Rather than focusing on the overall impact of trade 
sanctions, however, this paper examines the effects of the embargo on petroleum 
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products, a major strategic material and the last resort of sanctions against North 
Korea. An empirical analysis is conducted using the market prices of oil products as 
the main variable, as these prices allow an assessment of North Korea’s internal 
economic stability.  
Depending on the field, researchers who have studied the effectiveness of 
sanctions thus far have used difference-in-difference methods (before and after 
sanctions, whether the country is subject to sanctions) or a gravity model (when the 
dependent variable is the amount of trade) with dummy variables. A study using price 
indicators (exchange rates) relied on cointegrated VAR, in which case long-term 
macro time-series indicators were available. However, there is no suitable control 
group for North Korea, and neither the major variables required for the gravity model 
nor the macro time-series variables are sufficient to verify the impact of sanctions on 
North Korea. Therefore, the effects of sanctions against North Korea on the prices 
of petroleum products in North Korea are investigated by means of an event study, 
which is a methodology that utilizes dummy variables.  
 
III. Background of Sanctions on North Korea 
 
A. Overview of sanctions against North Korea 
 
There are two main types of sanctions imposed by the international community on 
North Korea. One is independent sanctions by countries such as the U.S., Japan and 
South Korea. The other is multilateral sanctions centered on the UN Security 
Council. The United States has been strengthening its sanctions recently, starting 
with the 2005 Banco Delta Asian Bank (BDA) financial sanctions. The major 
sanctions include the removal of North Korea from the international financial 
network, as well as secondary boycotts (businesses dealing with North Korea cannot 
deal with the United States). Japan has imposed its own sanctions on North Korea 
since the kidnapping of Japanese citizens and a nuclear test in 2006. South Korea 
suspended inter-Korean exchanges, except for the Kaesong Industrial Complex, in 
2010 by implementing 5.24 measures due to the attack on the South Korean warship 
‘Cheonan’, and South Korea shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex in 2016 due 
to a nuclear test. Other European countries are imposing their own sanctions.  
The UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea were introduced in 2006 
and were strengthened in response to North Korean missile launches and nuclear 
tests by the end of 2017. Therefore, sanctions against North Korea were enacted with 
the aim of dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons and forcing them to suspend 
long-range missile launches. The main means were to designate individuals and 
institutions linked to weapons of mass destruction as targets of sanctions and to 
restrict foreign trade or impose financial sanctions. 
Table 1 shows the timing and contents of the UN Security Council resolutions on 
North Korea that have been resolved since 2013 and the reasons why the resolutions 
were triggered. The main reasons for the sanctions were long-range missile launches 
and nuclear tests, and the resolutions were approved one to three months after North 
Korea’s actions. Many experts agree that sanctions against North Korea began to 
take effect in 2017, as Resolution 2321, which went into effect in December of 2016,  
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TABLE 1— UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AGAINST NORTH KOREA AFTER 2013 





2087 Jan, 2013 
Sanctions for 17 institutions and 9 
individuals 
Long-range missile launch 
in December 2012 
2094 Mar, 2013
Restrictions on North Korea’s mineral 
trade, including coal, banning the supply 
of air oil and rocket fuel to the North Korea
Third nuclear test in 
February 2013 
2270 Mar, 2016
Export ban of coal and iron ore except for 
people’s livelihood 
Fourth nuclear test in 
January 2016, long-range 
missile in February. 
2321 Dec, 2016 Upper limit on coal exports 
Fifth nuclear test in 
September 2016 
2356 Jun, 2017 
Freezing assets, banning overseas travel, 
adding blacklists
Launching a Ballistic 
Missile in May 2017 
2371 Aug, 2017 Total ban on coal exports 
July 2017, long-range 
missile trial launch 
2375 Sep, 2017
Upper limit of the supply of refined 
petroleum products (two million barrels), 
the freeze of the supply of crude oil
Sixth nuclear test in 
September 2017 
2397 Dec, 2017
Reduced supply of refined petroleum 
products to 500,000 barrels 
Launched long-range 
missile in November 2017 
  
set an upper limit on the export of anthracite, the top-ranked item among North 
Korean exports. Previous sanctions limited anthracite exports, but North Korea’s 
anthracite exports have not actually been hurt due to the livelihoods exemption 
clause. Moreover, since 2017, China, which accounts for 90% of North Korean trade, 
has participated in sanctions. 
UN Security Council Resolutions 2375 and 2397 are related to the introduction of 
crude oil and refined oil. Regarding Resolution 2375, which was determined in 
response to North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, restrictions on oil supplies appeared for 
the first time. This resolution froze North Korea’s crude oil imports to the current 
level of four million barrels, while limiting refined products to two million barrels 
per year. Resolution 2397, strengthened by North Korea’s missile launch, was agreed 
upon only three months after the previous resolution. This resolution retained the 
supply of crude oil but reduced the supply of refined products from two million 
barrels to 500 thousand barrels per year. 
 
B. Discussions of the effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea 
 
Recently, there have been discussions about whether the UN Security Council 
sanctions against North Korea are effective, if any, and if not, for what reason. Given 
that North Korean sanctions mainly affect North Korea’s foreign trade directly, the 
primary effects of North Korean sanctions can be confirmed through North Korea’s 
trade data. Figure 1 depicts North Korea’s import and export volumes between 2013 
and 2019. North Korea’s exports fell 38% year-on-year in 2017, when sanctions 
began to go into full swing, and in 2018 they decreased by 88% compared to 2017, 
after having already shrunk. This occurred because exports of anthracite, processed 
garments, and marine products, which ranked first to third among North Korean 
exports before the sanctions, were completely blocked by UN Security Council  
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FIGURE 1. NORTH KOREA’S TRADE VOLUME AND BALANCE 
Source: Korea International Trade Association. 
 
sanctions. North Korea’s imports appear to be better than its exports, but upon a 
closer examination of each item, imports of industrial machinery were banned, and 
there is an upper limit on the introduction of oil products, making it difficult to 
introduce intermediate goods necessary for economic activities. Moreover, a large 
trade deficit caused by exports falling more than imports is another challenge faced 
by the North Korean economy under sanctions. Before 2016, the trade deficit, which 
was less than $500 million, surged to $1.5 billion in 2017 and then to more than $2.4 
billion in 2019.3 
Looking at North Korea’s foreign trade, sanctions appear to have a significant 
impact on the North Korean economy. However, when probing the indicators related 
to the economic situation inside North Korea, different judgements become possible. 
Figure 2 shows the North Korean rice market prices and market exchange rates (the 
exchange rate of the North Korean won against the US dollar). Since mid-2013, rice 
prices have fluctuated depending on the season, but they remained stable at around 
5,000 KPW (North Korean won) per kg, and the exchange rate also remained at 
around 8,000 KPW per dollar. It is possible to consider that food, including rice, is 
not an item subject to sanctions, implying that imports are maintained and prices can 
be stabilized. Mun and Kim (2020) also showed that the exchange rate could be 
stabilized under sanctions on the assumption that the purposes of foreign currency 
are divided into value storage and trading in North Korea. As such, assessments of 
the impacts of sanctions on North Korea vary from sector to sector. 
There remains lack of rigorous verification of the effectiveness of sanctions 
against North Korea, as sanctions against North Korea are still in progress, and there 
is also insufficient credible data to confirm the North Korean economic situation. 
This study examines the effects of sanctions based on reliable oil market price data 
from institutions that have long accumulated North Korean price data. In addition,  
 
3North Korea is known to make up for its trade deficit through overseas workers. However, as sanctions against 
North Korea also prohibit the dispatch of workers abroad, the trade deficit, which has widened since the sanctions, 







2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Export Import Trade deficit
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(Unit: KPW/kg, KPW/USD) 
 
FIGURE 2. RICE MARKET PRICE AND MARKET EXCHANGE RATE IN NORTH KOREA 
Source: DailyNK. 
 
the study examines the effect of ‘smart sanctions’ that limit the import of certain 





A. Market price data for oil products in North Korea4 
 
The price data of North Korea’s refined oil products to be used in this study are 
the market prices of gasoline and diesel traded in the ‘Jangmadang’ (informal 
marketplace). DailyNK, specialized media targeting North Korea, regularly 
publishes figures on dollar exchange rates and the prices of major goods (e.g., rice, 
refined oil) traded in marketplaces in North Korea’s three regions (Pyongyang, 
Sinuiju, and Hyesan) on the web page “North Korea Market Trends.”5 The refined 
oil data used in this study are monthly price data from September of 2010 to 
November of 2018. 
At this point, we examine the price trends of gasoline and diesel traded in North 
Korean markets. Figure 3 shows the market prices of gasoline and diesel (based on 
the North Korean won). First, it can be seen that gasoline and diesel prices in 
Pyongyang, Sinuiju, and Hyesan do not vary significantly by region. Sinuiju and 
Hyesan are the center cities of trade bordering China, and Pyongyang, as the North 
Korean capital, serves as North Korea’s center not only in politics but also in  
 
4The prices in the marketplace used in this study were collected by DailyNK, a South Korean newspaper, rather 
than by North Korea’s statistics authorities or authorized agencies. Despite this limitation, DailyNK’s market price 
data are most widely used domestically and internationally as data to assess North Korea’s price levels and are 
recognized as reliable figures in that they are fairly similar to those by Asia Press, another media outlet related to 
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FIGURE 3. NORTH KOREA’S GASOLINE AND DIESEL MARKET PRICES (NORTH KOREAN WON) 
Source: DailyNK. 
 
economics. The coincidence of the market prices of gasoline and diesel in major 
cities in North Korea means that North Korea’s transportation and communication 
methods have been developed efficiently and demonstrate the law of one price.  
Second, the price trend is as follows. Gasoline and diesel prices, which were 
3,000~3,500 KPW and 1,950~2,200 KPW in mid-2010, respectively, rose steadily 
and recorded levels of 13,000 KPW and 8,500 KPW in mid-2013. This is nearly a 
quadrupling of the price of oil products in three years. From 2010 to mid-2013, North 
Korea experienced severe inflation, making it difficult to see this as a characteristic 
of refined oil prices. As shown in Figure 2, during this period, rice prices and 
exchange rates also skyrocketed; in November of 2009, North Korean authorities 
implemented a currency reform that set an upper limit on exchange amounts. As a 
result, North Koreans’ trust in North Korean currency was greatly reduced, and 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































10 KDI Journal of Economic Policy NOVEMBER 2020 
rates became stable. Those who study North Korea believe that stabilizing prices and 
foreign exchange rates have been the most notable economic phenomena since Kim 
Jong-un took power. 
From the second half of 2013 to the beginning of 2014, both gasoline and diesel 
prices stabilized, but by April of 2014, gasoline and diesel prices had doubled in all 
regions of Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan. In May of that year, prices returned to 
the March level but began to rise again in June, peaking in September, after which 
prices started to fall. The sharp rise and drop in gasoline and diesel market prices in 
2014 appears to be related to rumors of China’s cessation of crude oil supply to North 
Korea. According to Chinese customs statistics, by 2013 China had provided 
approximately 520 thousand tons (four million barrels) of crude oil annually to North 
Korea. However, since 2014, China’s crude oil exports to North Korea have been 
confirmed to have been officially absent. At the time (the first half of 2014), opinions 
were divided as to whether China actually stopped exporting crude oil to North 
Korea or changed the form of trade from commodity trading to aid. Although China 
has not yet recorded crude oil exports to North Korea in their customs statistics, it is 
highly likely that North Korea has introduced crude oil from China since 2014 as 
before. China’s customs statistics still show no crude oil exports to North Korea, but 
a recent report to the U.N. Security Council showed that China supplied four million 
barrels of crude oil to North Korea. Based on this, it can be said that China has not 
stopped supplying crude oil to North Korea since 2014. However, the skyrocketing 
market prices of gasoline and diesel in North Korea in 2014 show that North 
Korean’s sentiments were reflected in this background. According to media reporting 
on the lives of North Koreans at that time, it appears that North Korean military 
training was reduced due to the lack of oil supplies or that individual hoarding was 
widespread due to difficulties in introducing crude oil from China. 
From 2015 to early 2017, there were several price hikes, but lower than the volatile 
period in 2014. Since mid-2017, prices have soared again to the level of 2014, later 
entering a downward trend, staring in October 2017. In the second half of 2017, 
when the UN Security Council resolution on North Korea was announced, the price 
of refined oil in North Korea started to be affected. 
Refined petroleum products have greater homogeneous merchantability than other 
manufactured goods or services, making it easier to compare their international 
prices. Therefore, if the market prices of petroleum products in North Korea are 
converted into US dollars and compared to the international market price, it will 
become possible to grasp a different meaning from that analyzed by the North 
Korean won standard. Figure 4 shows North Korea’s monthly gasoline and diesel 
market prices converted into US dollars and compared to international prices. The 
international price is the price of petroleum products traded in Singapore, with values 
of 92RON for gasoline and 0.05% for diesel.  
Figure 4 clearly shows that North Korea’s market prices for both gasoline and 
diesel are unstable compared to international prices. In addition, both gasoline and 
diesel are priced higher than in international markets, although there are some 
exceptions. From September of 2010 to November of 2018, North Korea’s monthly 
market prices averaged 2.15 times higher for gasoline and 1.53 times higher for 
diesel than international prices. The largest gap between North Korea’s market prices 
and international prices was in October of 2017, when gasoline was 4.46  








FIGURE 4. NORTH KOREA’S GASOLINE AND DIESEL MARKET PRICES AND INTERNATIONAL PRICES 
Source: DailyNK; Korea National Oil Corporation (international) (http://www.opinet.co.kr/user/main/mainView.do) 
 
times and diesel was 4.29 times more. Given that international prices are sourced 
from Singapore’s oil spot market, it is common for prices to be lower than those in 
North Korea, as the latter can be referred to as consumer prices. Nonetheless, it can 
be considered abnormal that they are different by more than four times. This is 
believed to have been influenced by the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 
2375 on September 12, 2017, for the first time reflecting restrictions on oil supplies 
to North Korea. As such, international sanctions against North Korea may have had 
some impact on the North Korea’s refined oil prices. 
In addition, it can be seen that the degree of disparity between North Korea’s 
market price and international price varies depending on the oil type. From mid-2014 
to the end of the year and from mid-2017 to early 2018, the market prices of gasoline 
and diesel both skyrocketed, leading to a wide gap with international prices. 
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higher than the international market price, whereas the market price of diesel did not 
show much of a difference from the international market price. As such, whether the 
North Korean oil market price was actually influenced by sanctions or other factors 
will be examined in detail in the following sections. 
 
B. Determinants of refined oil products prices in North Korea 
 
What factors will affect North Korea’s oil prices? In order to confirm the impact 
of North Korean sanctions in this study, appropriate control of variables that can also 
affect the prices of petroleum products is necessary. 
Factors that determine gasoline and diesel prices in North Korean marketplaces 
can be divided into demand, supply and other factors. The demand-side factors 
include oil demand from the North Korean military, such as for military training and 
military operations; industrial demand for plant operations and power generation; 
and the demand for oil products from the private sector, including vehicles such as 
buses and trucks. On the supply side, China’s export price of refined oil, the export 
volume, and supply through crude oil refining can affect the price of oil in North 
Korea. Other factors include North Korea’s market exchange rate, their economic 
situation, and their development of oil-related technologies. In addition, external 
shocks such as sanctions against North Korea are factors that could affect oil prices 
in the country. However, due to the nature of the research subject here, North Korea, 
available data is scant. Among the variables expected to affect the prices of 
petroleum products, available data include the rice market price, the market 
exchange rate, North Korea’s gasoline/diesel import prices, and North Korea’s 
gasoline/diesel import volumes.6 
Rice market prices and exchange rates are the most widely used indicators of 
prices in North Korean economic research. As shown in Figure 2, the North Korean 
rice price has skyrocketed since the currency reform in 2009. Stabilized rice market 
prices and exchange rates since 2013 are considered to be evidence that North 
Korea’s prices have stabilized significantly since Kim Jong-un took power.  
Because North Korea is not an oil-producing country and is forced to rely on 
imports, the prices of refined petroleum products are bound to be affected by the 
volume of imports and import prices. Therefore, North Korea’s refined product 
import volume and unit price were used as control variables, with Chinese customs 
statistics providing these data. According to the customs statistics, China has not 
exported gasoline or diesel to North Korea since October of 2017. Instead, the UN 
Security Council’s North Korea Sanctions Committee provides information on the 
monthly volume introduced by North Korea since October of 2017 because 
Resolution 2375 requires a country that supplies refined products to North Korea to 
report these transactions. However, while information about supply amounts is 
provided, information about the unit price is not available. To understand the impact 
of sanctions on North Korea’s prices of refined oil products after October of 2017, 
 
6 Data related to North Korea’s consumption of refined products (training numbers from the North Korean 
military, consumption of oil by the private sector) and data related to supply (supply through crude oil refining) were 
not available and could not be used as control variables in the analysis. Instead, it is considered that these variables 
are not likely to have changed significantly over time. Thus, the analysis is performed under the assumption that 
they can be treated as constants. 
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data on the import prices of refined products after this point are required. We decided 
to use the average export price of China to the world instead of the export price to 
North Korea for refined products because the correlation coefficient between these 
variables is very high, at 0.84, and the relationship between the two variables is well 
maintained linearly for the entire period.  
Lastly, external factors such as sanctions are factors that can affect North Korea's 
oil product prices. The UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea, as 
shown in Table 1 above, appear to have had a direct impact on the North Korean 
economy and would naturally have affected oil prices. However, considering that the 
time interval between sanctions is not very long, it is not easy to identify the effect 
of each sanction on the prices of petroleum products. Moreover, North Korean 
economic agents may have reacted in advance in anticipation that sanctions would 
follow if North Korean authorities conducted nuclear tests or missile launches. 
Therefore, in this study, sanctions are divided into three categories according to the 
time period. The classification criteria were set as one sanction group when the time 
interval between sanctions was six months or less. According to this standard, the 
UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea listed in Table 1 are classified 
into Group 1 (2087 and 2094), Group 2 (2270), and Group 3 (2321, 2356, 2371, 
2377, 2397).  
 
V. Empirical Analysis 
  
A. Econometric model 
 
Based on the data mentioned, the following econometric model is constructed to 
analyze the impact of sanctions on the market prices of oil products in North Korea. 
We build panel data using monthly data from September of 2010 to November of 
2018 in Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan. Therefore, the panel model below is used 
for the analysis. It uses the aforementioned event study methodology as a means by 
which to check whether certain events, in this case sanctions against North Korea, 
affect economic variables. The event study methodology is widely used in financial 
sector research. It is commonly applied to research that analyzes the effects of certain 
news items on stock prices, and regarding North Korea, studies such as the effects 
of nuclear tests and missile launches on the South Korean stock market (Kim and 
Roland, 2014) are representative papers that apply the event study methodology. 
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1
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In the equation above, the subscript i  denotes the region and, t  is the point in 
time, 
,i t
y  is the value logged as the gasoline/diesel market price in i  region, and 
t  refers to the time. 
,i t
X  represents control variables, including the market price 
of rice (log), the market exchange rate (log), the price of China’s gasoline/diesel 
exports (log), and the amount of North Korea's gasoline/diesel imports to China. 
i
  
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refers to fixed effects that reflect the characteristics of the region. CAR   is an 
abbreviation of cumulative abnormal return, referring to the sum of AR  (abnormal 
return). AR  refers to abnormal returns that are not explained by common variables 
such as excess earnings or losses in the stock market. 
1
AR , which is the abnormal 
rate of return for the first period, is equal to 
1
CAR , and the abnormal rate of return 
t





. However, in the above 
model, the dependent variable 
,i t
y  indicates the North Korean oil price in market, 
not the stock price. In other words, North Korea's gasoline/diesel prices are affected 
by special events such as sanctions, in addition to the general economic variables 
(e.g., rice prices, exchange rates, the volume of import, import prices) that affect it, 
and they appear as AR . In this study, the above equation is modified as follows to 
examine the short-term effects from five months before the event occurs to five 
months after the event occurs. 
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In this equation, k  is an event affecting the price of refined oil in North Korea, 
and 
k
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, has a value of 1 during 
k
T t  
and 0 for the rest of the time. Using these dummy variables, we can observe the 
impact from five months before to five months after the occurrences of events 
affecting oil prices. As described in Chapter 4 above, North Korean sanctions were 
divided into three groups. Therefore, the observation period of each sanction group 
was set from five months before the first sanction in the group to five months after 
the last sanction in the group. 
Through the panel data, a pooled OLS model, a fixed effect model, and a random 
effect model can be used. Among these, prior verification is essential to adopt the 
most suitable methodology. The best option for the pooled OLS model is when the 
variance of 
i
 , a characteristic of each region, is zero. In other words, the regional 
characteristics of Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan do not differ much, and it can be 
confirmed that the actual market price of gasoline/diesel, the market price of rice, 
the exchange rate do not differ by region. In addition, the results of the LM test 
(Breusch and Pagan, 1979) do not reject the hypothesis that the variance of 
i
  is 
zero, leading to the conclusion that using a pooled OLS model is preferable to using 
a fixed-effects model. The Hausman test results also show that the pooled OLS 
model is the most appropriate methodology because the coefficients derived from 
the fixed-effect model and the random-effect model are not significantly different. 
The subsequent discussion therefore proceeds on the basis of the pooled OLS model. 
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B. Analysis of estimation results 
 
In this chapter, the results of the event study estimation equation above are 
presented and analyzed. Below is shown a figure of the impact of sanctions on North 
Korea on the market prices of refined petroleum products. Detailed estimation 
results, such as the coefficient values of various control variables, can be confirmed 
through the table in the appendix.  
As previously classified, the sanctions against North Korea were divided into three 
groups according to the timing, and the month in which the UN Security Council 
imposed sanctions on the North Korea is marked with red square blocks in Figure 5. 
The y-axis in the figure represents the abnormal return (the coefficient in the table in 
the appendix is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR ), and the number in Figure 5 




 ) for the prices of oil products in North Korea, which 
are confirmed after controlling for other explanatory variables. A high value of AR 
means that the abnormal portion of the price of refined petroleum products that is 
not explained by other control variables is large, which is indicative of the influence 
of sanctions against North Korea. This positive value means that sanctions on North 
Korea served to increase the prices of refined petroleum products. 
The sanctions in 2013, classified as Group 1, appeared to have had little impact 
on North Korea's refined oil prices. UNSCR 2270 (group 2), agreed upon in March 
of 2016, was a factor in the increasing gasoline prices, but the impact on diesel was 
relatively small. Moreover, the effect on gasoline prices also disappeared after three 
to four months. The sanctions that have greatly affected both gasoline and diesel 
prices are Group 3 sanctions after 2017. Abnormal return (prices) for gasoline and 
diesel due to sanctions have been outstanding for both types since May of 2017, 
when North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which led to the adoption of UN 
Security Council Resolution 2356 in June. Subsequently, three more sanctions 
against North Korea were resolved by the end of 2017, resulting in very high prices  
  
 
FIGURE 5. IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON THE PRICES OF REFINED OIL IN THE NORTH KOREAN MARKET 
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for gasoline and diesel, but the situation has not lasted long since 2018. According 
to Figure 5, gasoline prices were affected until the first half of 2018, but diesel 
appears to have been affected by sanctions until 2017. In other words, after the 
sanctions in 2017, the prices of refined products increased significantly in the short 
term, but the period was not long, and the prices recovered to their levels before the 
sanctions in 2017. 
These results indicate that the price fluctuations in North Korea's petroleum 
products due to sanctions are attributed to sentimental factors of North Koreans, such 
as hoarding. There has been news that the stockpiling of oil products occurred 
immediately after sanctions but that the prices stabilize to the level before sanctions 
because the total quantity supplied to North Korea was secured through the 
smuggling of petroleum products. In conclusion, with the exception of price 
fluctuations due to the psychology of North Koreans, the market prices of gasoline 
and diesel in North Korea have remained constant without much change, meaning 
that the impact of sanctions on the prices of refined petroleum products has been 
short-lived. 
The impact of other control variables7 on the prices of gasoline and diesel in 
North Korea is as follows. First, the increase in market exchange rates increased the 
market prices for gasoline and diesel. This is consistent with intuition, in that both 
gasoline and diesel are not produced in North Korea and must therefore be imported 
from foreign countries, and prices of oil products must be positively influenced by 
exchange rates. Second, the market price of rice does not affect the price of gasoline, 
but it has a negative correlation with the price of diesel. Considering that diesel is 
used for transportation, such as buses and cargo trucks, and that gasoline is used for 
general passenger cars in North Korea, a decrease in rice prices means an increase 
in the demand for rice, which increases the demand for transportation and logistics 
vehicles such as trucks, which could lead to an increase in the market price of diesel. 
Therefore, it can be interpreted that the price of rice only affects the price of diesel, 
which is the fuel of trucks, and does not affect the price of gasoline, required for 
private vehicles only for political elites, especially in North Korea. Third, the export 
price of petroleum products in China, which was used as a proxy variable for North 
Korea's import price, has a positive effect on both gasoline and diesel market prices. 
North Korea’s gasoline and diesel import prices (≈ China’s export prices) are the 
benchmark prices of gasoline and diesel sold in the market; hence, the export price 
and market price must be closely linked. In addition, gasoline and diesel import 
volumes had a positive effect on each market price, but the coefficient value was 
very close to zero, meaning that the effect appears to be negligible. In general, 
assuming that all other conditions are the same, the price will fall if the quantity of 
imported goods increases. However, the import data of gasoline and diesel used in 
this estimation are official data gained through the customs agency and do not 
include smuggling or crude oil refining in North Korea. Given evidence that 
smuggling levels exceed the official volume, which will be addressed in the next 
chapter on the smuggling volume of petroleum products, the result here appears to 
be reasonable given that the official import volumes have scant effects on the market 
prices. 
 
7See the appendix for specific coefficient values of the control variables. 
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VI. Discussion of the limited impact of sanctions 
  
Summarizing the findings above, despite restrictions on the introduction of 
petroleum products into North Korea, internal prices have only been shocked in the 
short term but have stabilized over the long term. Naturally, one can't help but 
wonder, "Why is the market price of refined oil in North Korea stable despite the 
fact that sanctions restrict the introduction of oil?" In this regard, we can hypothesize 
that North Korea’s oil supply is maintained despite sanctions.8  We borrow the 
discussion of the annual reports of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee 
on North Korea to verify this hypothesis. These reports detail North Korea's 
smuggling of refined petroleum products. It is widely known that smuggling was 
active in the border area between North Korea and China even before the sanctions. 
However, it appears that wider and more diverse forms of smuggling have been 
spreading as the UN Security Council strengthens its sanctions against North Korea. 
The smuggling of refined oil is carried out through transshipments in international 
waters. These volumes are not dealt with through customs but are illegal, which 
explains why they are of course not recorded in official statistics. 
Official reports from the governments of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and 
the US provided information about the total volume of refined oil products 
introduced by North Korea prior to sanctions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
South Korea9 and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations10 estimate that the total 
amount of refined petroleum products introduced by North Korea in 2016 reached 
4.5 million barrels (about 600 thousand tons11), respectively. 
Given that the two countries’ officially announced that the introduced levels of refined 
products in North Korea are identical, it is appropriate to regard the amount of refined 
oil introduced in North Korea as 4.5 million barrels before the sanctions. The amount 
of refined oil officially introduced by North Korea through customs in 2016 is 278 
thousand tons. Therefore, if smuggling is regarded as the total introduced amount of 
600 thousand tons minus the official introduction amount of 278 thousand tons through 
customs, the amount of refined oil introduced by North Korea through smuggling 
can be estimated to be more than 300 thousand tons. This means that the amount of 
refined oil introduced through smuggling even before the sanctions is significant.  
 
8It is also possible to hypothesize that the consumption of petroleum products in North Korea has decreased 
since the sanctions. This means that the North Korean military’s training may have decreased in preparation for 
sanctions, or the demand for transportation has decreased due to the sanctions. In this regard, there is anecdotal 
evidence such as news that the demand for transportation has decreased due to coal export sanctions or that military 
training has been reduced, but these effects are difficult to verify numerically in the absence of relevant data. 
9South Korea`s foreign ministry reported in a press release that imposing an annual cap of two million barrels 
of oil to North Korea would cut about 55 percent of its oil products. “U.N. Security Council Resolution 2375 Adopts 
Sanctions on North Korea” (http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_3976/view.do?seq=366621&srchFr=&amp;srch 
To=&amp;srchWord=&amp;srchTp=&amp;multi_itm_seq=0&amp;itm_seq_1=0&amp;itm_seq_2=0&amp;compa
ny_cd=&amp;company_nm=,). 
10“Fact sheet: U.N. Security Council Resolution 2397” of the U.S. Embassy and consulate in Korea reported, 
“In 2016, 4.5 million barrels (about 600,000 tons) of oil were imported by North Korea” (https://kr.usembassy.gov/ 
ko/122217-fact-sheet-un-security-council-resolution-2397-north-korea-ko/). 
11 Regarding refined petroleum products, the density varies by type. Thus, when converted from barrels in 
volume to tons in weight, a difference occurs depending on the type. Because 4.5 million barrels of refined petroleum 
products can be considered to be approximately 530 to 670 thousand tons, the median was assumed to be 600 
thousand tons. When converting barrels into tons, refined petroleum products are generally divided by 7.6, a value 
which, if applied, is calculated to be 592 thousand tons. 
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The UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea publishes annual 
reports on the implementation of sanctions, and these provide information about 
North Korea's introduction of illegal refined oil in the face of sanctions. Two annual 
reports in 2019 and 2020 contain information about the names and capacities of 
tankers entering and leaving from Nampo port (North Korea’s largest port, near 
Pyongyang). In addition, the reports calculate estimates of the oil products 
introduced by North Korea through illegal transshipments, assuming that 33 percent, 
50 percent and 90 percent of the total capacity is loaded. Table 2 summarizes the 
relevant contents. The 2019 report provides information about a total of 148 illegal 
transshipments during the period from January to August of 2018, mentioning also 
that the frequency of transshipments has increased since September. According to 
the three scenarios regarding capacity ratings, it is estimated that North Korea 
smuggled approximately 110~300 thousand tons of refined oil products during this 
period.12 If the period is simply extended proportionally until December, the volume 
introduced through illegal transshipments is estimated to be between 150 thousand 
tons and 400 thousand tons. If the official amount of 48 thousand tons13 is added, 
the amount of refined petroleum products introduced by North Korea in 2018 would 
reach between 200 thousand and 450 thousand tons.14 The 2020 report contains 
illegal transshipment information from January to October of 2019. Calculating 
identically to the 2018 figures, the volume of refined petroleum products introduced 
by North Korea in 2019 is estimated to be 290 to 670 thousand tons. Assuming that 
tankers were operating at 90 percent capacity, this means that the amount of refined 
oil introduced by North Korea has not decreased significantly compared to the 
approximate level of 600 thousand tons, i.e., the pre-sanction amount. 
This is believed to be strong evidence that prices of North Korean refined 
petroleum products have not been significantly affected despite sanctions on oil 
import restrictions. After the sanctions, the introduction of refined products through 
informal channels such as smuggling increased significantly, and the North Korean 
authorities appear to be desperate to meet the minimum oil demand required to run 
the economy. This does not mean that sanctions against North Korea have not had 
all of their intended effects. As noted earlier, North Korea’s foreign trade has reached 
the level of collapse since the sanctions. In addition, it is the lifting of sanctions that 
North Korean authorities most desperately wanted during the two former U.S.-North 
 
12Based on this, the U.S. representative to the United Nations claimed the amount of refined oil introduced to 
North Korea has exceeded the limit, but Russia and China argued that the U.S. estimate of North Korea's illegal 
transshipments is only fragmentary information and cannot be confirmed as a violation of sanctions because it is not 
conclusive evidence. 
13The U.N. Security Council’s sanctions committee’s website contains information about the amount of refined 
oil introduced into North Korea in an official manner since October of 2017. This provides information about the 
amounts of North Korea’s official refined oil imports (https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/supply-
sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum). 
14The estimated total introduced volume in 2018 was significantly reduced compared to the 600 thousand tons 
introduced in 2016, before the impact of the sanctions. This estimate is when the introduced amount from January 
to mid-August of 2018 was simply extended to December. According to the report, the frequency of smuggling 
increased significantly in the second half of the year. Therefore, the actual smuggling volume in 2018 is likely to be 
greater than the figure estimated in this study. The demand for petroleum products would have also declined due to 
sanctions. As exports of North Korea's major export items such as anthracite were banned due to sanctions against 
North Korea, it is highly likely that the demand for transportation from mines to ports also decreased. In addition, 
as sanctions have reduced economic activity in North Korea’s marketplace, the demand for transportation between 
markets across the country may have also declined. These factors imply that prices are only affected in the short 
term, despite the fact that estimates of the introduction of refined products in 2018 have decreased. 
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TABLE 2— ESTIMATES OF NORTH KOREA'S INTRODUCTION OF REFINED OIL PRODUCTS 
Note: Based on the UN Security Council’s North Korea Sanctions Committee report, *Values extended to December 
(33 to 90%) are calculated in simple proportion to December, **The official introduction amount is quoted by the 
United Nations Security Council’s North Korea Sanctions Committee, ***The final estimate is the sum of the figures 
extended to December and the official introduction. 
 
Korea summits in 2018 and 2019. As such, sanctions against North Korea appear to 
have some effect. On the other hand, it seems that North Korean authorities’ attempts 
to bypass or avoid sanctions will continue with regard to strategic materials such as 




The international community’s sanctions against North Korea triggered by North 
Korea’s nuclear tests and missile launches are regarded as unprecedentedly strong 
sanctions in history. North Korea’s major exports were banned, leading to the 
collapse of the country’s exports, which is expected to cause problems in its foreign 
currency supply if the situation continues to escalate. However, rice prices and 
exchange rates observed in North Korea’s informal markets, which illustrate the 
economic situation inside the country, have been confirmed to be fairly stable even 
after the sanctions. Many experts predict that as the sanctions continue, prices and 
market exchange rates are also likely to become unstable. 
This study examined the market price fluctuations of refined products, the main 
embargo item and target of the sanctions on North Korea. Immediately after the 
sanctions against North Korea commenced, the market prices of gasoline and diesel 
temporarily skyrocketed, reflecting North Koreans’ sentiment that the oil supply will 
be limited. However, sanctions only temporarily affected the prices of North Korean 
refined oil products, with gasoline and diesel returning to their old prices within a 
few months. Despite the fact that the amount of refined oil introduced due to 
sanctions has been drastically reduced, price stability can be seen as a type of puzzle. 
A clue to this can be found in an annual report by the UN Security Council Sanctions 
Committee on North Korea. 
The reports by the UN Security Council’s North Korea Sanctions Committee 
 2019 Report 2020 Report 
Period January to mid-August, 2018 January to October, 2019 
Number of illegal 
transshipments 
148 221 
Total capacity of tankers 2.5 million barrels (330 thousand tons) 4.32 million barrels (570 thousand tons) 
33% capacity 0.83 million barrels (110 thousand tons) 1.44 million barrels (190 thousand tons) 
50% capacity 1.25 million barrels (160 thousand tons) 2.16 million barrels (280 thousand tons) 
90% capacity 2.27 million barrels (300 thousand tons) 3.89 million barrels (510 thousand tons) 
Extended to December 
(33~90%)* 
1.17~3.2 million barrels  
(150~400 thousand tons) 
1.73~4.67 million barrels  
(230~610 thousand tons) 
Official introduction** 48 thousand tons 56 thousand tons 
Final estimate*** 200~450 thousand tons in 2018 290~670 thousand tons in 2019 
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calculate the estimated quantities of refined petroleum products introduced by North 
Korea through illegal transshipments and disclose information on these amounts. 
Based on this data, it is possible that North Korea’s import volumes of refined oil 
have not changed much despite the sanctions.  
However, this analysis does not entirely deny the effectiveness of sanctions 
against North Korea. Energy sources such as oil are directly related to the stability 
and maintenance of the North Korean regime, meaning that North Korean authorities 
are likely to be more sensitive to these than to other items. Therefore, despite strong 
sanctions, the North Korean authorities appear to find loopholes, such as the 






TABLE A1— ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE EVENT STUDY EQUATION 
(a) Gasoline 
Variables Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Log (Foreign exchange rate)
0.668*** 0.820*** 0.857*** 
(0.117) (0.0955) (0.0911) 
Log (Rice price) 
0.0951 0.0345 0.0237 
(0.130) (0.0986) (0.0952) 
Log (China export price) 
0.855*** 0.951*** 0.854*** 
(0.193) (0.0639) (0.0712) 
Import volume 
7.48e-06 1.58e-05*** 1.29e-05*** 
(5.94e-06) (3.61e-06) (3.62e-06) 
Group 1 
(CAR) 
2020.09 -0.205* -0.327*** -0.318*** 
(0.122) (0.118) (0.112) 
2020.10 -0.293 -0.477*** -0.485*** 
(0.186) (0.174) (0.164) 
2012.11 -0.528** -0.838*** -0.844*** 
(0.236) (0.221) (0.208) 
2012.12 -0.761*** -1.150*** -1.180*** 
(0.282) (0.260) (0.245) 
2013.01 -0.996*** -1.524*** -1.565*** 
(0.323) (0.295) (0.278) 
2013.02 -1.224*** -1.866*** -1.925*** 
(0.362) (0.327) (0.307) 
2013.03 -1.450*** -2.210*** -2.284*** 
(0.403) (0.361) (0.339) 
2013.04 -1.666*** -2.521*** -2.620*** 
(0.441) (0.391) (0.368) 
2013.05 -1.639*** -2.588*** -2.716*** 
(0.479) (0.419) (0.393) 
2013.06 -1.562*** -2.623*** -2.775*** 
(0.512) (0.443) (0.416) 
2013.07 -1.503*** -2.702*** -2.870*** 
(0.546) (0.467) (0.438) 
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TABLE A1— ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE EVENT STUDY EQUATION (CONT’D) 
(a) Gasoline 
Variables Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Group 2 
(CAR) 
2015.11 -0.265** -0.321*** 
(0.116) (0.113) 
2015.12 -0.407** -0.533*** 
(0.170) (0.171) 
2016.01 -0.343 -0.577*** 
(0.216) (0.217) 
2016.02 -0.246 -0.584** 
(0.266) (0.270) 
2016.03 -0.0899 -0.524 
(0.317) (0.330) 
2016.04 0.467 -0.0639 
(0.369) (0.393) 
2016.05 1.258*** 0.617 
(0.420) (0.450) 
2016.06 1.568*** 0.840* 
(0.466) (0.505) 
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TABLE A1— ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE EVENT STUDY EQUATION (CONT’D) 
(a) Gasoline 






















-3.326*** -4.767*** -4.303*** 
(1.126) (0.516) (0.544) 
Observations 129 222 297 
R-squared 0.882 0.860 0.877 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
 
(b) Diesel 
Variables Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Log (Foreign exchange rate) 
1.025*** 1.299*** 1.354*** 
(0.123) (0.134) (0.121) 
Log (Rice price) 
-0.188 -0.325** -0.377*** 
(0.128) (0.137) (0.125) 
Log (China export price) 
0.0578 0.551*** 0.591*** 
(0.253) (0.0824) (0.0869) 
Import volume 
5.41e-06 1.87e-05*** 1.86e-05*** 
(3.83e-06) (4.41e-06) (3.96e-06) 
Group 1 
(CAR) 
2020.09 -0.340*** -0.510*** -0.498*** 
(0.126) (0.164) (0.147) 
2020.10 -0.488** -0.725*** -0.707*** 
(0.191) (0.244) (0.219) 
2012.11 -0.673*** -1.036*** -1.018*** 
(0.244) (0.310) (0.279) 
2012.12 -0.705** -1.221*** -1.206*** 
(0.292) (0.369) (0.332) 
2013.01 -0.764** -1.440*** -1.432*** 
(0.337) (0.420) (0.378) 
2013.02 -0.779** -1.653*** -1.652*** 
(0.378) (0.465) (0.418) 
2013.03 -0.803* -1.881*** -1.883*** 
(0.425) (0.511) (0.459) 
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TABLE A1— ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE EVENT STUDY EQUATION (CONT’D) 
(b) Diesel 
Variables Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Group 1 
(CAR) 
2013.04 -0.859* -2.172*** -2.182*** 
(0.469) (0.551) (0.495) 
2013.05 -0.737 -2.251*** -2.271*** 
(0.506) (0.589) (0.529) 
2013.06 -0.521 -2.174*** -2.206*** 
(0.542) (0.624) (0.560) 
2013.07 -0.321 -2.103*** -2.144*** 
(0.582) (0.660) (0.592) 
Group 2 
(CAR) 
2015.11 -0.348** -0.337** 
(0.163) (0.148) 
2015.12 -0.525** -0.500** 
(0.241) (0.222) 
2016.01 -0.717** -0.679** 
(0.308) (0.288) 
2016.02 -0.857** -0.803** 
(0.375) (0.354) 
2016.03 -0.788* -0.707* 
(0.447) (0.428) 
2016.04 -0.741 -0.634 
(0.526) (0.508) 
2016.05 -0.330 -0.200 
(0.594) (0.579) 
2016.06 -0.148 -0.00116 
(0.656) (0.644) 
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TABLE A1— ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE EVENT STUDY EQUATION (CONT’D) 
(b) Diesel 






























0.842 -3.695*** -4.006*** 
(1.398) (0.680) (0.678) 
Observations 129 222 297 
R-squared 0.870 0.781 0.826 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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